Australian Jews have realised what European Jews fatally learnt in the late 1930s: that charity and philanthropy, that good citizenship, will be ungratefully received by those who lean towards antisemitism and otherness ideologies. There is no distinction drawn between practising and secular Jews.
We did some scoping analysis some months ago, incidental to other research, for which we framed this problem statement: ‘Is antisemitism a canary in the cage? Examining whether the recent rise in antisemitism in Australia is a proxy for changes in the national disposition’. We are not convinced from that analysis, despite the increase in incidents, that Australians are any more antisemitic than they were prior to the 7 October massacre. Admittedly, it is possible that events since have fostered antisemitism or have surfaced antisemitic sentiment that went unknown.
However, our initial thinking is that the past eleven months have revealed changes in the national disposition. If so, what is experienced or perceived as antisemitism might be something more ideologically virulent, directed against Australian Jews as convenient, legitimised, and contemporary. Recall how Palestinian supporters represent a cross-section of the political left. Their attacks have also been against our democratic institutions, society, and national values. And their narratives have coalesced around the language of ‘settler colonialism’, ‘whiteness’, and ‘indigeneity’.
None of this will provide comfort to Australian Jews who justifiably feel unsafe in their own country. But it is potentially significant for its broader implications. Counterintuitively, this may help Australian Jews on certain future national trajectories. On our observation, Australian Jews have adopted the modus common to Jewish diasporas, of being good citizens, assimilating, and making contributions to society in part to secure their place. For analytical purposes, we described this ‘small target’ approach as the ‘quiet performance’ strategy.
As an exercise, we developed two alternative strategies. One is to shift from a ‘small target’ to a ‘big target’ approach, by drawing in cross-sectional interests and support to frame their cause as part of a bigger national cause. We described this as a ‘strong performance’ strategy. The other alternative is to shift from a ‘small target’ to a ‘fleeting target’, by advocating for public rights and protections which can be privately enforced for more self-reliance as a community. We described this as a ‘measured performance’ strategy. Each strategy has its merits and weaknesses.
We have shared this part of our work to show our support for Australian Jews. But we have also done so because we are concerned the recent rise in (notional) antisemitic incidents reflects dangerous changes in our national disposition. If so, this has implications for national defence and security.
Of course, we are aware of public and private efforts to restore and maintain social cohesion. But we are not convinced they will prove effective, to the extent this is even about social cohesion. Changes in the national disposition may only appear as democratic and social dis-cohesion. Because we approached the situation from an intellectual warfare perspective, we identified some ‘course-correctors’ to the national disposition, which would also support national cohesion efforts. That is why we turned our attention to the levers of civic duties, national will, and Australian values.
Australian Jews face a similar dilemma to European Jews in the late 1930s: do they stay as they are, in the hope things will improve; or do they flee, if so to where else. The Holocaust and the existence of Israel may only marginally alter their calculations. But fellow Australians should not face this dilemma.